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Abstract Until the mid-1980s, transport policy was
considered by many as one of the least successful
domains of the European integration project. How-
ever, from the early 1990s onwards, there are clear
signs of a single European transport policy, along
with the accompanying implementation of infrastruc-
ture projects. What is the explanation for such a
change in pace? This paper aims to offer insight in
these processes by looking at the mechanisms which
form and transform this policy domain. To under-
stand the state of a policy domain and its dynamics
over time an institutional approach is taken. Two
concepts in political science, ‘policy arrangements’
and ‘supranational governance’ are combined and
used as a framework to analyse the European
transport policy domain. This analysis describes the
development of several elements: organisations,
rules, the transnational society, power, resources,
and the central transport discourse. It demonstrates
that all of these elements have developed from an
intergovernmental setting towards a more suprana-
tional one. This development was slow in the first
decennia when European transport policy was rather
passive, but it picked up speed in the 1980s and
1990s. In the pivotal year of 1985, pressure from the
transnational society resulted in a rapid change of the
rules, the resources and the discourse.
Keywords European transport policy 
Historical perspective  Policy arrangements 
Supranational governance  Trans-European networks
Introduction
In 1968, Ju¨rgensen and Aldrup assessed the progress in
developing a common European transport policy,
announced in the founding Treaty of the European
Economic Community (EEC) in 1958. They concluded
that ‘‘die gemeinsame Verkehrspolitik in der EWG
sich zehn Jahre nach Gru¨ndung der Gemeinschaft
immer noch im ‘status nascendi’ befindet’’1 (Ju¨rgensen
and Aldrup 1968, p. 7). More than a decade later,
Erdmenger repeated the same observation by stating
that ‘‘time and again the common transport policy has
been the saddest chapter in the history of European
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1 ‘‘Ten years after the founding of the Community the
common transport policy of the EEC is still in a ‘status




integration’’ (Erdmenger 1983, p. 89). The European
Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) complained that
‘‘the general trend towards European integration and
increased worldwide cooperation has virtually
by-passed transport infrastructure’’ (ERT 1989,
p. 22). What is the explanation for this lack of
integration,2 especially when taking into consideration
that the transport sector was already seen as one of the
pillars of integration in 1958 (Title IV, Treaty of
Rome)? And how can one understand the current
revival of the European transport policy domain; which
has put it centre stage and has resulted in influential
white papers and billions of Euros invested in infra-
structure projects?
The European transport policy domain has received
much academic attention (Banister et al. 1995; Bayliss
1965; Bro¨cker et al. 2004; Jensen and Richardson
2004; Ju¨rgensen and Aldrup 1968; Ravesteyn and
Evers 2004; Stevens 2004). These contributions
mainly focussed on the outcomes of the domain
(transport policy in general or specific projects) or
the connections to other policy fields (for example
territorial cohesion or spatial planning). Here, we are
interested in the mechanisms that (re)create the policy
domain itself. The main goal of this paper is to offer
more insight in the questions: why was it initially so
difficult to achieve integration of transport policy and
how did it shift to a faster mode of integration in the
mid 1980s? The paper will separately trace the
development of elements which directly influence
(trans)formation of the transport policy domain. To this
end, we will use theoretical concepts found in political
science, combining the theory of ‘supranational gov-
ernance’ (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998) with the
concept of ‘policy arrangements’ (Arts et al. 2000).
After introducing European transport policy, these
concepts will be discussed, accompanied by an anal-
ysis of the separate elements. Finally, this theoretical
synthesis is further elaborated to highlight the crucial
elements in the development of the European transport
policy domain.
Introducing EU transport policy
Transport policy is receiving more attention at the
European level in recent years, as increasingly more
policy documents are drafted (CEC 1992, 1999,
2001, 2003a, b). At first sight it is strange that the
process of integration in the transport policy domain
was initially slow; as it has a clearly recognized
importance for the entire European integration pro-
ject. Jensen and Richardson contend that the process
of European integration is closely linked to the goal
of a single European market and the four freedoms:
movement of goods, persons, services and capital
(Jensen and Richardson 2004, p. 3). These freedoms
depend heavily on a single and coherent transport
network, which can enable seamless movement
throughout the entire EU: ‘‘[When] trade is expand-
ing and trade flows diverting, transport costs are of
vital importance’’ (Bayliss 1965, p. 3). Banister et al.
even state that ‘‘infrastructure is the key to an
integrated Europe’’ (Banister et al. 1995, p. xiii).
Transport also has intrinsic characteristics which
make it an important domain for European integra-
tion: it contributes an estimated 7–8% to the
European Gross Domestic Product (GDP); it receives
around 40% of the investments by member states
(TINA Vienna 2002, p. 5); and it employs 4.1% of all
employed Europeans (approximately 6.3 million
people) (Bosch 2003, p. 7). Daily, ‘‘the transport
industries and services of the European Union have to
get more than 150 million people to and from work,
enable at least 100 million trips made in the course of
the work, carry 50 million tonnes of goods’’ on a total
network of more than 3.5 million kilometres (Bosch
2003, pp. 7, 11).
The growth of European transport is linked to the
overall growth in European GDP (Barnes and Barnes
1995, pp. 79–80; Eurostat 2007) and the ‘‘socio-
economic, spatial and political dynamics of society’’
(Nijkamp et al. 1994 as quoted in Banister et al.
1995, p. 3)—as shown in Fig. 1.
The significance of transport and infrastructure for
European integration was recognized during the foun-
ding of the EC and translated into eleven articles in the
Treaty of Rome (1958), based on recommendations of
2 In this paper we focus on political integration which can best
be described in the words of Leon Lindberg (1963) as ‘‘[…] (1)
the process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to
conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of
each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to
delegate the decision-making process to new central organs;
and (2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct
national settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and
political activities to a new center.’’ Physical integration of
transport networks can be a result of political integration.
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the Spaak Report (1956).3 The central themes of the
transport Title were: (1) (non-) discrimination in
charging, (2) development and financing of infrastruc-
ture, and (3) a common transport policy (Spaak 1956,
p. 15; see also Stevens 2004, p. 37).
The development of European policy domains:
a historical perspective
European Union policy domains do not fit into
recognized theories of policy and political integration
(Barnes and Barnes 1995). The leading two theories
which explain European integration, neo-functional-
ism and intergovernmentalism, can be seen as two
sides of a spectrum representing the power of the
member states to control the integration process
(Verdun 2002, pp. 10–16).
Neo-functionalism versus intergovernmentalism
Neo-functionalists (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963; Sch-
mitter 1970) assert that the process of integration is
driven by supranational institutions, foremost by the
European Commission. These supranational institu-
tions are able to take autonomous decisions and thus
influence the integration process independently from
the will of the member states. Neo-functionalists
assume that EU integration is driven by a spill-over
mechanism (integration in one policy field triggers
integration in other related policy fields).
Intergovernmentalists (Hoffmann 1964, 1966), on
the other hand, claim that the member states are the
dominant actors who control the integration process.
All major decisions are the result of intergovernmen-
tal bargaining and its outcomes reflect the relative
power of the individual member states. Although
states delegate limited powers to supranational insti-
tutions, they do not relinquish sovereignty to them.
The concepts of supranational governance
and policy arrangements
Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (Sandholtz
and Stone Sweet 1998, 1999) have developed an
alternative explanation of European integration,
coined ‘supranational governance’. Supranational
governance describes the European Union as a series
of regimes, each specializing in a specific policy
domain, whereby the degree of integration varies
between policy domains. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet
visualise this by using a continuum with intergov-
ernmental governance on one side and supranational
governance on the other. The existence of rules/
organisations4 along with the focus of actors on the
Fig. 1 Link between
transport growth and
European GDP (indexed;
1985 = 100) (edited from
CEC 2002)
3 As it is rumoured, the transport delegates present at the
negotiations were locked in a room and the negotiators,
frustrated by failure to agree on a common transport policy,
were only willing to led them out if they presented an agreed-
upon transport policy framework Bayliss (1965).
4 Sandholtz and Stone Sweet use the term organisation in a
sociological sense. The sociological literature on organisations
and institutions would label the European Parliament, the
European Commission, and the Council of Ministers as organ-
isations, while the rules governing their interaction and the rules
they produce would be called institutions. For an introduction to
the study of institutions and organisations see Scott (2007).
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European level jointly determine the location of a
specific policy field on this continuum. Supranational
governance occurs because individuals, groups and
firms increasingly act across borders. Thus, the
degree of supranational governance in a particular
sector depends on the relative intensity of transna-
tional activity. Those actors who gain an advantage
with European level rules (and are disadvantaged by
national rules) will push for more supranational
governance. The result is the shift of policy making in
a respective policy field from an intergovernmental to
a supranational mode.5 EU organisations produce,
execute and interpret these European rules. Intergov-
ernmental bargaining is seen as part of the process;
however, instead of being the driving force behind
integration, the member states primarily react to the
demands of a transnational society and to suprana-
tional organisations/rules. The influence of the
member states thus varies between policy fields.
From the initial step towards supranational poli-
cymaking, there are three key elements structuring
this process: (1) European rules—legal constraints on
behaviour which structure the interactions between
political actors; (2) European organisations—govern-
mental structures operating at the European level; and
(3) transnational society—non-governmental actors
who are engaged in intra-EC exchange, thereby
influencing policymaking processes and outcomes
(Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998, p. 9).
We use the three elements of supranational
governance (rules, organisations and society) to
analyse the development of a European transport
policy. In order to better understand the evolution of
transport policy, we also use the concept of ‘policy
arrangements’ (defined by Arts et al. (2000)) which
relates to organisation and substance. Central organ-
isational elements are: the policy coalitions (several
competing groups of people who engage in the same
policy processes in order to achieve similar policy
goals), power, the available resources, and the rules
of the game (formal and informal rules defining the
possibilities and constraints of policy coalitions).
Substance relates to the policy discourse ‘‘which
refers to concepts, ideas, views, buzzwords and the
like, which give meaning to a policy domain’’ (Arts
et al. 2000, p. 56). The combination of the theory of
supranational governance with the concept of policy
arrangements offers insight into the mechanisms
which influence policy change and helps explain the
change in pace of the integration of transport policy.
The development of the EU transport domain
European transport organisations
The main bodies of the European Community
currently taking decisions on transport policy are
the Council (Council of Ministers on Transport,
Telecommunications and Energy), the Commission
(to be more precise, the Directorate General for
Transport until 2000, then merged into the Director-
ate General Transport and Energy) and the European
Parliament with its Committee on Transport and
Tourism. The European Economic and Social Com-
mittee and the Committee of the Regions have to be
consulted. Several organisations providing technical
and/or scientific advice in certain areas were estab-
lished recently, for example the European Maritime
Safety Agency in 2002 and the European Railway
Agency in 2004. In addition, the common transport
policy is subject to the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Justice.6
In 1958, decision-making in the transport policy
domain was subject to the consultation procedure;
the Commission initiated proposals which the Coun-
cil approved or rejected. The Council had to wait for
the opinion of the Parliament, but had no obligation
to incorporate this opinion into the legislative act.
Thus, the Council (as the intergovernmental body of
the European Community) was the dominant political
institution.
In the 1980s, the Committee on Transport and
Tourism of the European Parliament demonstrated its
dissatisfaction with this situation through a critical
assessment on the progress of the EU transport policy
domain. It stated that the Commission was working
too much in an incremental fashion (not guided by a
5 Note that in this model the dominant direction of the course a
policy field takes is from intergovernmental to supranational
governance. Although one can easily imagine that policy-
making in certain fields is changed from a supranational back
to an intergovernmental mode of governance, historical
examples of policy fields taking that direction are hard to find.
6 For a more thorough description on how these organizations
deal with transport, see Te Bro¨mmelstroet (2005).
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clear vision) and that the Council was too passive (49
proposals were pending for a decision) (Abbati 1986,
p. 74). In 1983, the European Parliament brought the
Council before the European Court of Justice, which
ruled partially in favour of the Parliament in 1985.7
The Court ruled that the Council was in breach of its
obligations as it failed to adopt a common transport
policy (CEC 1985).8 The political effect was signif-
icant, resulting in the drafting of the first White Paper
on transport in 1992 (see below).
With the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), European
transport policy moved to the co-decision procedure
(Article 251 EC), meaning that the European Parlia-
ment does not only give an opinion, but it also has to
agree with the proposal. If the Parliament and the
Council cannot reach an agreement, a conciliation
committee works on reaching a compromise. Thus,
the Parliament has a right of veto, sharing equal
power with the Council. Initially this procedure was
only applicable to a list of important infrastructure
projects, but in 1997 it was extended to include all
transport legislation (Stevens 2004, p. 78). This new
situation was immediately used by the Parliament; it
sought to find a new political equilibrium concerning
transport policy-making. In a first ‘‘rather bloody
co-decision and conciliation process’’, the European
Parliament flexed its muscles, ‘‘as it asserted its new
role in EU decision making’’ (Jensen and Richardson
2004, p. 130). The dispute centred the question: who
was to decide on the reallocation of significant
transport budgets, the Council or the Parliament?
The new power balance led to a shift of focus away
from only defining guidelines towards implementing
and enforcing European transport policies. This is
especially visible in the case of infrastructure, which
was subject to the co-decision procedure 5 years prior
to other policy areas. Currently, there are six high
ranking corridor coordinators who push forward the
hampered development of a European transport
network. In addition, there is currently a new proposal
by the Commission to set up a ‘‘Trans-European
Transport Network Executive Agency’’ (CEC 2005).
This agency would provide supranational guidance to
the progress of all European infrastructure projects.
Supranationalism is increasingly present in the
operational frameworks of formal European transport
organisations, as illustrated by the dispute between
the Parliament and the Council. This is a typical
policy domain dispute, where governance shifts from
the intergovernmental (Council) to the supranational
(European Parliament).
European transport rules
We will not go into detail on all laws and rules
developed in the past 50 years, focusing instead on
important transport legislation which influences the
behaviour of transport stakeholders (for example,
lower-tier governmental bodies and investors). These
developments can be grouped in four broad historic
periods in the rule making process.
The period from 1958 to 1970 started with the Title
IV in the Rome Treaty, which only gave broad
outlines for common rules typified as a ‘‘relative
harmonization minimum [which is] far too general’’
(Bayliss 1965, p. 2; Ju¨rgensen and Aldrup 1968, p.
94). The articles of Title IV can be seen as ‘‘flags (…)
marking the minefield of explosive disagreement’’
(Stevens 2004, p. 40). Article 74 EEC (new Article 70
EC) described that a common transport policy has to
be developed as a framework for future rules and
policies. Article 75 EEC (new Article 71 EC)
specified that these rules should focus on international
transport to, from, or across member states and
conditions under which non-resident carriers may
operate in other member states. This article also stated
that the Council has to act unanimously. By implying
that all transport ministers should first agree on new
rules it consequently renders the domain intergovern-
mental. In 1961, the Commission initiated the first
draft of a common transport policy, accompanied by
an action programme (CEC 1961). After some
adaptations, the Parliament agreed with this plan;
but the Council could not agree unanimously. Some of
the principles of this unauthorised policy proposal
were implemented later (for example the ability for
European bodies to directly intervene in undesired
national transport decisions and the abolishment of
state support and discrimination of non-state carriers).
Only in 1967, when transport policy became subject to
qualified majority voting, some progress was made
with the adoption of a general transport policy
document and a small number of rules.
7 13/83 European Parliament vs. Council of the European
Communities [1985] ECR 1513.
8 For a discussion of the mechanisms that turn judgments into
political decisions see Nowak (2007).
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The period from the early 1970s up to the early
1980s can be typified as a period which started with a
revival, but finished with new frustrations between the
rule-making organisations. The Commission was not
pleased with the achieved progress and developed
a 5-year program (CEC 1971), which had minor impact
as only marginal measures were adopted by the
Council. In 1973, a report was published including an
extended scope of transport policy, linking it to other
policy domains and suggesting rules, in order to align
the transport systems, planning, financing systems and
the possible introduction of infrastructure charges
(CEC 1973). Again, the Council took no action to
approve this document (Stevens 2004, p. 49). The
European Court of Justice did put additional pressure
on the policy domain, by declaring that Article 48 EEC
(now Article 39 EC) on the freedom of movement is
also applicable to the transport domain.9 Supported by
the European Parliament, the Commission developed a
list of rules and measures corresponding with the 1973
report; however the Council again failed to reach
agreement on these rules.
The third period started in the mid 1980s, with a
call by the Commission for a fresh start and for
renewed concentration on achievable (but significant)
transport rules. In accordance with the general Euro-
pean line, there were several calls to initiate a process
of liberalisation in the transport domain (CEC 1983a,
b). The transport domain once again became a vital
part of the general unification project. It was judged
that for a viable free movement in a unified Europe,
more integration of transport rules was of crucial
importance (and was indeed introduced with the
Single European Act). In 1990, an action plan for
infrastructure projects of European importance was
introduced. Enforced by the Council’s decisions in
1993, it resulted in European road, rail and inland
waterways network plans (Trans-European networks).
The Treaty of Maastricht (1993) revitalised the
progress in the transport domain by restating its
importance and by emphasising infrastructure devel-
opment. In the same year, a first transport White Paper
was published, laying down a common transport
vision and policy, again with a focus on infrastructure
development (CEC 1992). The Commission realized
that ‘‘efforts and resources should be concentrated on
a small selection of high priority projects’’ (Lyons
2000, p. 167). In the light of Article 155 of the Treaty
of Maastricht, projects were chosen which ‘‘had
economic benefit, improved safety, reduced conges-
tion, [created a] cleaner environment and improved
choice’’ (Lyons 2000, 163). In 1995, a developed
transport action plan showed a broader coherent
approach towards European transport policy (CEC
1995). In 1998, the new White Paper showed an
ambitious transport policy domain, aiming for a shift
of traffic from road to rail and the introduction of road
charges (CEC 1998). A 2001 revision of the White
Paper introduced over 60 rules and measures with the
overarching goal of breaking the self-enforcing link
between economic growth and the growth of (unsus-
tainable) transport (CEC 2001). The list of
infrastructure projects was also revised. It was recog-
nised that there were considerable implementation
problems. In 2005, a report from the Commission
signalled that only limited progress in transnational
networks has been made and that new European
initiatives (steering committees, ambassadors etc.)
were needed in order to generate additional impetus.
The previous focus on a modal shift was dropped and
now the main aim was to facilitate intermodal traffic.
During the first two periods European transport
rules see limited progress. The Council did not
comply with the goals and ambitions set in 1958 and
only passed a small number of the numerous rules
developed by the Commission and the European
Parliament. The mid 1980s brought some changes
and progress with a focus on infrastructure plans.
Most notably after the Treaty of Maastricht, many
rules were developed and enforced, including issues
other than infrastructure schemes.
Transnational transport society
Here, we will discuss the European Round Table of
Industrialists, described by some as ‘‘the single most
powerful business group in Europe’’ (Gardner 1991,
p. 48) and seen as one of the scant pressure groups
which can actually change European policy (Endo
1999). We use the lobbying activities of the European
Round Table as a proxy for cross-border transactions.
The European Round Table pressures the relevant
European institutions on all topics that are relevant
for the larger business community. During the 1980s
it focused its attention in particular on the European
9 167/73 Commission of the European Communities vs.
French Republic [1974] ECR 359.
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transport domain. They felt that European infrastruc-
ture was not competitive with other global players,
especially due to the border crossings, and started to
lobby through a series of official reports. In 1984, the
first report on infrastructure focused on the missing
cross-border links in the infrastructure network (ERT
1984). In 1987, the following report addressed many
aspects of the transport domain, from policy coordi-
nation to technology development (ERT 1987). A
1989 report addressed the inadequacy of the European
transport policy domain and its decision-making
processes, highlighting a growing need for a renewal
of the existing infrastructure networks (ERT 1989).
With the ‘Missing Networks’ report, the European
Round Table addressed the outdated forms of orga-
nisation and decision-making, which produced
underinvestment and created a crisis in the European
transport networks (ERT 1991a). In the same year, the
European Round Table provided an agenda for the
future of European integration, emphasizing the role
of transport (ERT 1991b). Before the European Round
Table realigned its focus to other domains, their last
report on transport in 1992 proposed the founding of a
supranational centre for infrastructure issues (ERT
1992). Thereafter, the focus of the European Round
Table shifted to other areas and to date there has been
no new transport related report published.
These reports played a crucial role in framing the
absence of adequate infrastructure into a critical
policy problem for the European integration project
(Jensen and Richardson 2004, pp. 73–75 and pp. 101–
102). Figure 2 shows a powerful image, illustrating
the higher transport costs (in time and money) when
compared to the USA (a key market competitor of
Europe). This discrepancy is used by the transna-
tional society to create political awareness for the
importance of a single European transport network. A
great majority of the cross-border links recently
developed in the EU were proposed in one of the
European Round Table reports: namely the Øresund
link, Trans-Alp connections and the Channel tunnel
between France and England.
Using the European Round Table as a proxy for
the transnational transport society, it is striking to
note that the bulk of their lobbying efforts took place
in a relatively short time span (1984–1992). Before
and after this period, the European Round Table did
not publish any report on this matter as, according to
their spokesperson, the members felt to have con-
veyed their message clearly and witnessed some of
the expected results of their activities.
European transport power and resources
The amount of European funding assigned to the
transport domain (especially for infrastructure pro-
jects) is one of the clearest indicators of the actors’
ability to mobilise transport resources.10 Conse-
quently, we analysed the funds which are directly
or indirectly allocated for developing infrastructure.




the USA and Europe (ERT
1991b, p. 38)
10 We are aware that there are more indicators for this policy
domain aspect, that there are more sources of funds and that the
focusing only on infrastructure projects is limiting; however,
taking into account the scope of this research and the available
data, this serves as a good proxy.
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Until the 1980s, the general level of investment in
transport infrastructure in the EU had been stable at
about 1% of the Gross Domestic Product (CEC 1992,
para. 143). ‘‘Despite a steady increase in traffic flows in
the EU, investment in inland transport declined from
1.5 to around 1% between 1975 and 1980’’ (Barnes and
Barnes 1995, p. 81). However, from 1980 onwards, the
European budget shows a steady increase of funds
earmarked for transport. It should be noted that this
budget is used for co-financing infrastructure projects
up to a maximum of 30%. The other 70% is contributed
by the member states and other stakeholders. In 1993, a
sharp jump in funding can be seen with the introduction
of the Cohesion Fund, primarily earmarked for funding
infrastructure projects (see Fig. 3).
There is an additional dimension to this increase in
European funding, when it is compared with the
combined annual infrastructure expenditures of all
member states. Figure 4 shows a steady increase until
1993, when the figure stabilized around 70 billion
Euros (CEC 2000, p. 10).
The Commission is now looking for new ways to
increase the funds earmarked for infrastructure. In a
2005 memorandum, Transport Commissioner Barrot
wrote that the budgets (although significant) are still
insufficient to implement the 30 priority projects. He
proposed to increase the budget (for these 30 Trans
European Network-projects alone) to 140 billion
Euros for the period 2007–2013. This amount should
be collected by increased returns from infrastructure
charges and national funding (CEC 2005), along with
an increase in EU contribution from 30% to 50%.
Also, the participation of the private sector in the
funding of these projects is discussed; however, as
emphasized by a representative of the largest lobby
group of potential investors in such infrastructure
projects (ASECAP), private companies are only
willing to invest if there is a clear and long-term
European vision underlying the proposed networks
and individual projects. Otherwise the risks would be
too great.11
European transport discourse
We use the term discourse as a shared view by a
group of actors on (1) how something is, (2) how
something should be and (3) how to get from the
existing situation to the desirable state of affairs (see
also Arts et al. 2000, p. 66). In the beginning of
European integration, (with six member states) there
were two groups with sharply conflicting discourses
on transport. Both were based on economic market
principles and saw the existing situation as subopti-
mal, but both had conflicting ideal visions on how to
overcome the current problem (Ju¨rgensen and Aldrup
1968, p. 84). One group supported the ‘Anglo-Saxon’
approach that transport should be completely market
led, with low responsibility of public authorities and
free choice of transport for carriers and clients
(‘laissez-faire’). A second group strongly supported
the opposing ‘Continental approach’, which interprets
transport as an instrument of public policy, where
public intervention with the aim of correcting market
failure is seen as inevitable or at least preferable
(Abbati 1986, p. 52). The biggest promoters of this
discourse were West-Germany and France (Stevens
2004, p. 23). Both discourses were deeply rooted in
Fig. 3 EU funds with a transport label (based on the Official
Journal of the European Union 1981–2006)
Fig. 4 Total annual expenditure of European member states
related to transport infrastructure (CEC 2000)
11 The interview was held in June 2005 with mister Dionelis,
general secretary of ASECAP—the European Professional
Association of Operators of Toll Road Infrastructures.
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culture, history and social models of the member
states (Hayward 2001, p. 265).
Over time, a new discourse developed in other
policy domains which addressed non-economic foun-
dations for European integration. The free movement
of goods, persons, services and capital should create a
stronger Europe, one which is able to compete with
the USA and the Soviet Union (later Russia), also in
geopolitical issues. However, the focus on economic
integration in the transport domain persisted until
1985, as did the deadlock in the Council. As a result
other (non-economic) transport matters were also
hampered in their development (e.g. a common
transport vision, or a single European network).
Two crucial events took place in 1985. Firstly, the
already discussed judgment of the European Court of
Justice in (European Parliament vs. the Council)
forced the Council to make progress on important
issues. Secondly, Jacques Delors was appointed
president of the Commission and remained on the
post for a decade. Many authors see this decade as the
real start of European integration (see Bache and
George 2006; Barnes and Barnes 1995; Dinan 1998;
Hix 2005; Peterson and Bomberg 1999). Delors
focused on the following key points: (1) too many
rules and too few results; (2) the internal market
needed to be completed and (3) addressing these
points required a strong focus on implementation and
policy reforms. This strongly supported the European
Court of Justice’s ruling on the transport domain.
Delors proved to be a champion for the transport
policy domain, because he saw infrastructure projects
as direct and indirect job creating mechanisms and as
a crucial part of advancing the internal market. It
could create employment in peripheral areas and link
them to central regions of Europe. This view united
the member states in efforts to create a list of the
most beneficial projects: the Trans European Network
lists. The first list (the Essen list developed by the
High Level Group chaired by Christophersen) was
selected from a long catalogue of national wish-list
projects, which were mainly targeted at increasing
employment. The total number of jobs created by
these projects were projected between 100,000 and
200,000, with up to 400,000 additional jobs projected
as indirect growth (Christophersen 1995, p. 39).
With the fall of the Iron Curtain (1989) and the
collapse of the USSR (1991), a new transport
situation emerged, which imposed large East-West
transport demands on a strongly North-South oriented
network. Infrastructure was seen as the main instru-
ment for re-uniting these two parts of Europe. But the
potential for success of the common transport
discourse (focused on infrastructure projects) was
hampered by a lack of finance and therefore, two new
competing discourses emerged. One came from the
environmental domain, which first criticized the lack
of environmental attention in the transport domain,
but then proposed different selection criteria for
projects instead (focusing on a modal shift from road
to rail and a more sustainable transport policy). The
other discourse wanted to place transport more at the
heart of European integration and emphasized the
role of infrastructure networks in the core objectives
of the European Union: cohesion, equal opportunities
for all citizens, bridge-building to new and future
member states and structural improvements of
peripheral areas (CEC 2002). To achieve the goals
of the latter discourse, the transport budget should be
increased (for example through the Cohesion and
Structural Funds). Although the two discourses are
aiming at different ideals, they are not as conflicting
as the previous two. The new dichotomy creates
longer decision-making processes and sometimes
conflict,12 but it does not create deadlocks, nonethe-
less due to the fact that the participants in both
discourses are no longer only ministers of member
states. Lobby groups, committees and stakeholders
(all with significant interest to keep the issue moving
forward) have also joined the discourses.13
Until the 1980s the European transport domain
suffered from two conflicting economic discourses
that were deeply rooted in the world views of
member states. This created a deadlock in the
Council, making unanimous decision-making impos-
sible. Delors shifted the focus away from pure
economic reasoning towards a vision of infrastructure
as a job creating mechanism and as a crucial element
of the internal market. Together with the 1985 ruling
of the European Court of Justice, this new focus
12 At the moment of writing, Poland is resisting the development
of a highway, claiming that it destroys valuable nature areas (see:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/aug/02/endangered
habitats.endangeredspecies?gusrc = rss&feed = environment).
13 The question of legitimacy is further discussed by Monbiot
(2001) in general and by Te Bro¨mmelstroet (2005) specifically
for the transport policy domain.
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aligned the member states and their interests.
Changes in the context and the developing transport
problems were also strong incentives, stimulating the
synthesis of a single central discourse. Recently, new
conflicts have risen between the socio-economical
perspective and the environmental protection per-
spective on infrastructure. Yet, this dichotomy is not
as paralysing as the initial conflict.
Conclusion: European transport synthesis
The analysis of the five elements of the transport
policy domain, based on supranational governance
theory and policy arrangements, shows that all have
more or less evolved from the intergovernmental
more towards the supranational end: (1) more deci-
sion-making power for the European Parliament and
Commission; (2) stronger European rules; (3) a shift
of the stakeholders’ attention away from the nation
states towards Brussels; (4) growing European fund-
ing replacing national funding; and (5) a stronger
discourse emphasizing the role of European transport
policy. Additionally, there are strong interrelations
between these elements.
The pivotal year is 1985; thereafter, increasingly
stronger rules governing transport policy were estab-
lished on a European level, tremendously
strengthening the supranational element of transport
policy. The European Court of Justice contributed to
this boost by creating a new balance between the
Commission, the Parliament and the Council. It is also
around this year that the transnational society (repre-
sented in this paper by the European Round Table)
applied significant pressure on the European institu-
tions. The appointment of Delors as President of the
European Commission generated an extra impetus for
the transport policy domain. When his term ended in
1995, a common transport policy document was
published and many Trans-European-Network-pro-
jects were in place. With such instruments in place,
the transnational transport society got a new push;
regions, non-governmental organizations and other
lobby groups (even environmental protection groups)
turned their attention to influencing the lists of
infrastructure projects, especially through the empow-
ered Parliament (Jensen and Richardson 2004, p. 35).
The discourse conflict can be seen as the main
element which was curbing integration well before
1985. The lack of consensus on the general aims of
European transport policy resulted in the vague
transport rules found in Title IV of the Rome Treaty.
Another effect of this conflict is the institutional
deadlock in the Council, preventing it from achieving
consensus on rules and policy directions due to
strongly opposing blocks of ministers. With the
development of a common discourse under Delors,
fuelled by outside pressures (notably the European
Round Table), the deadlock in the Council was
broken and progress was first made on infrastructure
projects (the importance of which was recognised by
all actors) and then on a common transport policy. In
the early 1990s, when the absence of strategic funds
for financing this ambitious infrastructure program
was painfully clear, the focus shifted to creating more
financial opportunities. The establishment of the
Cohesion Fund was a big step forward and it attracted
additional attention from the growing transnational
transport community.
Currently, the transport policy domain has a
central place in the European integration project,
supported by important white papers and legislation.
Also, more tangible accomplishments in the form of
infrastructure projects are now realized, partly due to
European funds (for example the Betuwelijn, the
tunnel between France and England and the Øresund
bridge). Other infrastructure projects that were seen
as missing links in an European network are under-
way (for example the new Gotthard rail tunnel and
Pyrenean rail links). One result of the growing
ambitions in the transport area is a loud call to
earmark more funds for infrastructure. Implementa-
tion difficulties have resulted in initiatives which
called for an increased role of EU institutions and
regulations in transport matters (especially cross-
border projects). New rules are proposed by the
Commission to allow a larger share of European
investment in projects than the currently allowed
maximum of 30% (CEC 2005).
Although this analysis illuminates the direction and
pace of development in the European transport
domain, its future path is difficult to project. We do
not expect it to continue growing at the accelerated
pace of the past two decennia. Currently, other policy
domains (notably environment) are increasingly ham-
pering progress in the transport domain. Contextual
developments (concerns on increased supranational
tendencies mirrored in the difficulties surrounding the
42 GeoJournal (2008) 72:33–44
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new Constitutional Treaty) also hamper additional
advancement. Our analysis suggests that progress is
extremely difficult when a policy domain reaches the
point of full supranationality, due to multiple sources
of resistance, such as: the member states which are
losing power; the citizens who see unwanted devel-
opments and crucially the other conflicting (and more
mature) policy domains. However, according to the
theory of supranational governance, recourse to
strengthening intergovernmental governance seems
highly unlikely (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998,
p. 16).
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